By John Sivils
Free speech protection ends where true threats begin. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined “true threats” as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” However, the Court has not meaningfully expounded on the true-threats doctrine since Virginia v. Black, leaving federal circuits split on the meaning of intent in a true-threat analysis. State high courts have further muddled the intent question in true-threats jurisprudence by adopting analytical standards that differ from the federal appellate circuits in which they sit.
John Sivils, Note, Online Threats: The Dire Need for a Reboot in True-Threats Jurisprudence, 72 SMU L. Rev. F. 51 (2019).
Further Related Reads
- Larry Alexander, Inciting, Requesting, Provoking, or Persuading Others to Commit Crimes: The Legacy of Schenck and Abrams in Free Speech Jurisprudence, 72 SMU L. Rev. 389 (2019).
- Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The Clear and Present Dangers of the Clear and Present Danger Test: Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72 SMU L. Rev. 415 (2019).
- G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. Rev. 513 (2019).