Online Threats: The Dire Need for a Reboot in True-Threats Jurisprudence

By John Sivils

Abstract
Free speech protection ends where true threats begin. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined “true threats” as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” However, the Court has not meaningfully expounded on the true-threats doctrine since Virginia v. Black, leaving federal circuits split on the meaning of intent in a true-threat analysis. State high courts have further muddled the intent question in true-threats jurisprudence by adopting analytical standards that differ from the federal appellate circuits in which they sit.

John Sivils, Note, Online Threats: The Dire Need for a Reboot in True-Threats Jurisprudence, 72 SMU L. Rev. F. 51 (2019).

Further Related Reads

• Larry Alexander, Inciting, Requesting, Provoking, or Persuading Others to Commit Crimes: The Legacy of Schenck and Abrams in Free Speech Jurisprudence, 72 SMU L. Rev. 389 (2019).
• Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The Clear and Present Dangers of the Clear and Present Danger Test: Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72 SMU L. Rev. 415 (2019).
• G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. Rev. 513 (2019).